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ABSTRACT
This paper examines public health law in the context of prospect theory, the leading behavioral
account of risk aversion and risk-seeking. The paper first demonstrates how international
environmental law can be mapped along prospect theory’s risk-seeking axis. It then completes this
picture of prospect theory by examining National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
which upheld the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”).
Although Sebelius upheld the PPACA as an exercise of the federal government’s taxing authority, it
reasoned that a directive aimed at uninsured individuals to buy health insurance lay beyond the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. There is now at least a tacit liberty interest
against being coerced to insure against health risks, enforced in constitutional doctrine through a
limit on Congress’s power to regulate commerce. Applying that interest against coercion to defeat
compulsory acceptance of annuity-like income streams would complete a legal axis that actively
defends the right of the healthy, optimistic individual to refuse risk-averse hedges against
improbable losses or against the comparably improbable failure to attain future wealth. For good or
ill, therefore, the law of intellectual property and health care, as illustrated through international
law on biodiversity conservation and through constitutional controversies involving universal health
care coverage, appears to privilege private risk-seeking behavior over risk-averse public policy. So
spins the law’s Pinwheel of Fortune.
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PINWHEEL OF FORTUNE
JAMES MING CHEN*

If you’ve got no place to go, if you’re feeling down
If you’re all alone when the pretty birds have flown
Honey I’m still free
Take a chance on me . . .
Take a chance, take a chance, take a chance on me1

* © James Ming Chen 2014.
Justin Smith Morrill Chair in Law, Michigan State University; Of Counsel,
Technology Law Group of Washington, D.C. I presented this paper on November 8, 2013, at the John Marshall Review
of Intellectual Property’s 2013 symposium, “IPublic Health: The Intersection of Intellectual Property and Public
Health.” I presented a version of this paper on October 2, 2013, at a faculty workshop at the Michigan State
University College of Law. Christopher French, Andrew Long, Sean Pager, Andrew Torrance, Ryan Vacca, and
Katharine Van Tassel provided helpful comments. Special thanks to Heather Elaine Worland Chen.
1 Hear ABBA, Take A Chance On Me, on ABBA: The Album (Polar Music International AB, 1977).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Neither the global environment nor personal health should come down to
gambling. “One life to live” is not just a soap opera; it is an indisputable medical
directive. “In the long run we are all dead.”1 The goal is to put off the long run as
long as we can. As for the earth at large, this too bears remembering: “One planet,
one experiment.”2
In light of such infallible wisdom, to say nothing of the judiciary’s innate
suspicion of gambling,3 one might expect both international environmental law and
domestic health law to rank among the law’s most risk-averse enterprises. One
would be wrong. The law of global biodiversity protection and the constitutional
debate on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”)4 rest on
astoundingly risk-seeking assumptions and pronouncements.
Charged with
conserving the global biospheric commons, the international community seems
affirmatively eager to place deep, out-of-the-money bets on bioprospecting of rare and
endangered species for pharmaceutical gain.5
The truly desperate state of
biodiversity and climate change law has apparently prompted some very rich
countries (especially the United States) to behave as if these sources of truly
irreparable environmental harm defy meaningful precautions.6
Within America’s own borders, the constitutional law of public health strikes a
comparably risk-seeking pose. Once upon a time (in 1936 to be exact), the Supreme
Court treated the “[t]hreat of loss, not the prospect of gain, [as] the essence of

1 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1924); see also ROBERT
SKIDELSKY, KEYNES 56 (Oxford University Press 1996); cf. JOHN IRVING, THE WORLD ACCORDING TO
GARP 688 (Modern Library 1998) (“[I]n the world according to Garp, we are all terminal cases.”).
2 EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 182 (2d ed. 1999).
3 See, e.g., Phalen v. Va., 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850) (decrying “the widespread pestilence
of lotteries” as a disease that “infests the whole community; . . . enters every dwelling; . . . reaches
every class; . . . preys upon the hard earnings of the poor; [and] plunders the ignorant and simple”);
accord Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 356 (1903).
4 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 119 (2010).
5 See generally, e.g., E.A. Evans-Illidge & P.T. Murphy, A New Approach to Benefit Sharing in
Bioprospecting, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF MARINE SCI. 6, http://www.cbd.int/doc/case-studies/abs/cs-absau.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2014) (arguing that bioprospecting, despite its high costs and high risks,
is likely to yield beneficial and profitable commercial products); Michael I. Jeffery, Bioprospecting:
Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing Under the Convention on Biodiversity and the Bonn
Guidelines, 6 SING. J. INT’L COMP. L. 747, 747 (2002) (describing how rapid advances in
biotechnology have prompted a surge of interest in commercializing biodiversity).
6 See generally, e.g., Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling
the Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 703, 706–07 (1995)
(explaining why source countries are unlikely to capture the full benefits of newly discovered
bioactive compounds, “[b]ecause almost all screening facilities are located in the developed world”
and because “the identification of a valuable plant” might create such “tremendous demand that
expansive harvesting [would] lead[] to extinction”); Jeffery, supra note 5, at 748 (noting that “the
current concern over the earth’s continuing ‘biodiversity crisis’, in combination with the clear
economic significance of genetic resources, has provided the basis for which bioprospecting . . . has
become the recent focus of much attention”).
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economic coercion.”7 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,8 the
2012 decision upholding the PPACA, suggests otherwise. Although Sebelius upheld
the PPACA as an exercise of the federal government’s taxing authority, it reasoned
that a directive aimed at uninsured individuals to buy health insurance lay beyond
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.9 If Congress may not compel
(presumably young, healthy) people to buy health insurance, precisely because those
individuals believe that they are better off bearing the relatively modest risk of
catastrophic illness or injury, Congress likewise should not have the power to compel
wage-earners to accept annuities or annuity-like income streams through Social
Security or through limitations on IRAs and employer-sponsored retirement plans.10
International environmental law and American health law act perversely
precisely because they are products of human decisionmaking that address life and
death issues at the very points where emotion overrides reason. These otherwise
baffling phenomena manifest different facets of prospect theory, the leading
behavioral account of risk aversion and risk-seeking.11 These two bodies of law
provide enough material to cover the entire pinwheel-shaped “fourfold pattern” that
defines prospect theory.
Part I of this article, “Bioprospect Theory,” will demonstrate how international
environmental law can be mapped along prospect theory’s risk-seeking axis.
Although there is no defensible basis for treating pharmaceutical exploitation of
ethnobiological knowledge as the foundation of a coherent approach to global
economic development, international law squanders precious diplomatic capital on
the folly of bioprospecting.
Part II of this article, “The Patient in the Tower,” explores Sebelius as a distinct
illustration of prospect theory. Sebelius appears to embrace a theory of commerce
clause jurisprudence that carries more than a hint of substantive due process. There
is now at least a tacit liberty interest against being coerced to insure against health
risks, enforced in constitutional doctrine through a limit on congressional power to
regulate commerce. Applying that interest against coercion to defeat compulsory
acceptance of annuity-like income streams would complete a second, countervailing
legal axis, one that actively defends the right of the healthy, optimistic individual to
refuse risk-averse hedges against improbable losses or against the comparably
improbable failure to attain future wealth.
For good or ill, the law of intellectual property and health care, as illustrated
through international law on biodiversity conservation and through the leading
constitutional controversy involving universal health care coverage, appears to
privilege private risk-seeking behavior over risk management through public policy.
So spins the law’s Pinwheel of Fortune.

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 81 (1936).
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608–09 (2012).
9 Id. at 2587, 2591.
10 Id. at 2590, 2591.
11 See Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115,
1116 (2003) (“[P]rospect theory predicts that people generally make risk-averse decisions when
choosing between options that appear to be gains and risk-seeking decisions when choosing between
options that appear to be losses.”).
7
8

[13:761 2014] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

766

II. BIOPROSPECT THEORY12
Conventional wisdom treats biodiversity and biotechnology as rivalrous values.
The global south is home to most of earth’s vanishing species, while the global north
holds the capital and technology needed to develop this natural wealth. The south
argues that intellectual property laws enable pharmaceutical companies and seed
breeders in the industrialized north to commit biopiracy.13 By contrast, the United
States has characterized calls for profit-sharing as a threat to the global life sciences
industry.
Both sides magnify the dispute, on the apparent consensus that
commercial exploitation of genetic resources holds the key to biodiversity
conservation.
Both sides of this debate misunderstand the relationship between biodiversity
and biotechnology.14 Both sides have overstated the significance of bioprospecting. It
is misleading to frame the issue as whether intellectual property in the abstract can
coexist with the international legal framework for preserving biodiversity. As a
matter of legal gymnastics, any lawyer can reconfigure intellectual property to
embrace all of the intangible assets at stake, including raw genetic resources,

12 This section draws heavily upon a separate paper of mine.
See generally Jim Chen,
Bioprospect Theory (Oct. 21, 2012), available at http://bit.ly/BioprospectTheory.
13 See Jim Chen, There’s No Such Thing as Biopiracy . . . And It’s a Good Thing Too, 37
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 6 (2006).
14 See Jim Chen, Biodiversity and Biotechnology: A Misunderstood Relation, 2005 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 51, 52 (2005).
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advanced agricultural and pharmaceutical research, and ethnobiological
knowledge.15
The real challenge lies in directing the law of biodiversity conservation and the
law of intellectual property toward appropriate preservation and exploitation of the
global biospheric commons.16 Commercial development aids biodiversity primarily by
overcoming perverse economic incentives to consume scarce natural resources that
may turn out to have greater global, long-term value. We continue to debate these
issues not because we are rational, but precisely because we are not.
Indeed, legal approaches to biodiversity and biotechnology are so twisted that
they represent an extreme application of prospect theory. Nearly half a century
before Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky published Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision Under Risk,17 the 1979 article that would become the foundational work
of behavioral economics and the principal basis for Kahneman’s 2002 Nobel Prize in
Economics, the Supreme Court of the United States succinctly summarized a core
tenet of prospect theory: “[t]hreat of loss, not hope of gain, is the essence of economic
coercion.”18 In plainer terms, losing hurts worse than winning feels good. Stated in
formal terms, prospect theory posits that most individuals, as an expression of innate
risk aversion, fear potential losses far more than they covet potential gains.19
The law of biodiversity and biotechnology appears to reverse this presumption.
Although humans innately fear losses more than they value gains, worldwide policy
appears to assign relatively little value to biodiversity as an invaluable,
incommensurate, and indefinitely important component of global ecological health.20
Biodiversity loss is staggering and undeniable.21 Humans are responsible for the
sixth great extinction spasm of the Phanerozoic Eon, a unit of geologic time spanning
half a billion years.22 Cataclysmic loss of biological diversity is merely one of several
ecological threats looming over Holocene humanity.23
15 See Joseph Straus, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for Ongoing PublicPrivate Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 91, 104 (1998).
16 See Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89
IOWA L. REV. 495, 589 (2004).
17 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979).
18 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 82 (1936).
19 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 278–88 (2011) (providing Kahneman’s
own summary of prospect theory).
20 And human health, too. See Jim Robbins, The Ecology of Disease, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012,
at SR1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/sunday-review/the-ecology-of-disease.html.
21 See Jim Chen, Across the Apocalypse on Horseback:
Imperfect Legal Responses to
Biodiversity Loss, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 12, 12, 13 (2005); Jim Chen, Across the Apocalypse on
Horseback: Biodiversity Loss and the Law, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 42 (Charles R. McManis ed., 2007); Jim
Chen, Legal Mythmaking in a Time of Mass Extinctions: Reconciling Stories of Origin with Human
Destiny, 29 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 279, 283 (2005); Tracy Dobson, Loss of Biodiversity: An
International Environmental Policy Perspective, 17 N.C. J. INT’L. L. & COM. REG. 277, 279–81 (1992).
22 See, e.g., RICHARD LEAKEY & ROGER LEWIN, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: PATTERNS OF LIFE AND
THE FUTURE OF MANKIND 233, 234 (1996).
23 See Roy Scranton, Learning How to Die in the Anthropocene, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2013),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/learning-how-to-die-in-the-anthropocene.
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In assembling this brief analysis, I hasten to add this observation: so far I have
assigned no weight to global climate change, a threat that has raised the probability
of human extinction to a non-negligible value. Risks as grandiose as these, sufficient
in their magnitude to portend the end of civilization, possibly even the survival of
humans as a species, support the most dismal of theorems in the dismal science of
economics: “the catastrophe-insurance aspect of such a fat-tailed unlimited-exposure
situation, which can never be fully learned away, can dominate the social-discounting
aspect, the pure-risk aspect, and the consumption-smoothing aspect.”24 In plainer
language, the dismal theorem posits that “under limited conditions concerning the
structure of uncertainty and societal preferences, the expected loss from certain risks
such as climate change is infinite and that standard economic analysis cannot be
applied.”25
By contrast, the global north and the global south alike have reached an
apparent consensus that the primary object of the international debate over
“biopiracy” is the appropriate profit-sharing protocol (including the possibility of no
redistributive mechanism whatsoever) for gains from bioprospecting. Such gains, at
best, are highly speculative.26 Even if profits from bioprospecting are ever realized,
they will be extremely concentrated. No champion of redistributive justice on a
global scale could defend a system of transferring northern wealth that would favor
Brazil, Costa Rica, and Madagascar while neglecting Bolivia, Mali, and Afghanistan.
There simply is no defensible basis for treating ethnobiological knowledge as the
foundation of a globally coherent approach to economic development. Yet the global
community continues to spend its extremely small and fragile storehouse of political
capital on this contentious corner of international environmental law. Global
economic diplomacy should be made of saner stuff. The fact that it is not invites us
to treat the entire charade as a distinct branch of behavioral law and economics:
bioprospect theory.
Upon closer examination, prospect theory and related branches of behavioral
economics do supply a powerful explanation for international economic law’s
systematic failure to reach the optimal solutions for biodiversity conservation.
Prospect theory arises from three basic features of human beings’ core cognitive
system:
1. All decisionmaking takes place relative to a neutral reference point, or
“adaptation level.” Outcomes exceeding this reference point are gains.
Outcomes below the reference point are losses.

24 Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate
Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 1 (2009).
25 William D. Nordhaus, The Economics of Tail Events with an Application to Climate Change,
5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 240, 240 (2011).
26 [N]o plausible scientific argument at present supports the claim that the extinction of
species . . . courts environmental disaster. It is far more plausible that rare and endangered species
[are] affected by the environment but hav[e] little effect upon it. Moral, aesthetic, and spiritual
arguments amply may justify [biodiversity conservation], but an instrumental or economic rationale
appears beyond reach.” Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets
the Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 844 (1997).
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2. Loss aversion means that losses, when directly weighted or compared
against gains, loom larger.
3. Diminishing sensitivity applies to upward and downward perceptions
and to evaluation of changes of wealth. 27
In concert, these three principles—neutral reference point, loss aversion,
diminishing sensitivity—can be illustrated through a graph showing an
asymmetrical sigmoid curve (1) whose inflection point occurs at the neutral
adaptation level, (2) whose steeper slope below the adaptation level demonstrates
loss aversion, and (3) whose declining rate of change in both directions reflects
diminishing sensitivity to gains and to losses:28

Source: DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 283 (2011).

“If prospect theory had a flag, this image would be drawn on it.”29 The
asymmetrical utility curve that emerges from prospect theory’s reevaluation of
conventional accounts of expected economic utility leads to some seeming

See KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 282.
See id. at 282–83. One readily implemented way of parametrically modeling prospect theory
with closed-form expressions and elementary functions is the cumulative distribution function of the
log-logistic
distribution.
See
James
Ming
Chen,
Flagging
Prospect
Theory,
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2216916 (March 20, 2014).
See generally Peter R. Fisk, The
Graduation of Income Distributions, 29 ECONOMETRICA 171 (1961).
29 KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 282.
27
28
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contradictions.30 In mixed gambles, for instance, where a decisionmaker may realize
either a gain or a loss, loss aversion leads to extreme, even costly risk aversion. This
is the primary conclusion of prospect theory, the one most readily summarized by the
slogan, “losing hurts worse than winning feels good.”31
But prospect theory predicts affirmatively risk-seeking behavior in other
circumstances. When a decisonmaker is confronted with nothing but “bad choices”—
specifically, those “where a sure loss is compared to a larger loss that is merely
probable”—diminishing sensitivity to losses will generate a greater willingness to
absorb risk.32
Prospect theory therefore rests on two principal insights. First, humans “attach
values to gains and losses rather than to wealth.”33 Second, humans making
decisions assign “weights . . . to outcomes [that] are different from probabilities.”34
The combination of these two heuristics generates “a distinctive pattern of
preferences” that Kahneman and Tversky have called the “fourfold pattern”:35
The four-fold
pattern

Gains

Losses

High
probability
(certainty
effect)

E.g., a 95% chance to win
$10,000 leads to . . .

E.g., a 95% chance to lose
$10,000 leads to . . .

Risk aversion (annuities and
sinecures)

Risk seeking (rogue trading
and other reckless gambles)

Low probability
(possibility
effect)

E.g., a 5% chance to win
$10,000 leads to . . .

E.g., a 5% chance to lose
$10,000 leads to . . .

Risk seeking (lotteries)

Risk aversion (insurance)

Let us examine more closely each of the four vanes in prospect theory’s pinwheel
of fortune. Three of these four behavioral possibilities have long been understood;
prospect theory merely provided the means by which to describe them formally.36
The cell at top left describes how risk aversion leads people to lock in a sure gain
below the expected value of a gamble. Annuities work on this principle, as do
employment guarantees in unionized trades or on tenure-protected university
faculties.
The cell at lower right describes insurance: individuals will pay much more
than the expected value of a loss to insure themselves against the disturbing prospect
See id. at 285.
LEWIS GRIZZARD & KATHY SUE LOUDERMILK, I LOVE YOU: A GOOD BEER JOINT IS HARD TO
FIND, AND OTHER FACTS OF LIFE (1979); accord JOE GARAGIOLA, IT’S ANYONE’S BALLGAME (1988).
32 KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 285.
33 Id. at 316–17.
34 Id. at 317.
35 Id.
36 See id. at 318.
30
31
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of a catastrophic loss.37 On the flip side of that transaction, insurance companies can
pool risks assigned to them by risk-averse policyholders and profit from the spread
between expected losses and premium payments. These risk-averse decisions reflect
the core instinct of prospect theory.
But there is also a risk-seeking side to this account of human behavior.
Lotteries routinely exploit the possibility effect. When the potential payout is
enormous, ticket buyers become indifferent to their miniscule chances of winning.
This is the behavioral pattern reflected by the lower left cell. It is sufficiently
powerful that banks and credit unions have resorted to depositor lotteries to induce
lower- to middle-income customers to open and fund savings accounts.38
What Kahneman and Tversky found most surprising was the fourth possibility,
the one described in the risk-seeking cell at upper right. When humans face the high
probability of severe losses, they engage in affirmatively riskier behavior. Prospect
theory identifies two reasons for this sudden shift in strategy.39 First, diminishing
sensitivity means that humans react very adversely to a sure loss: “the reaction to a
loss of $900 is more than 90% as intense as the reaction to a loss of $1,000.”40 Second
and perhaps even more significant, humans assign a much lower decision weight to
an extreme loss than its rationally expected value as calculated by the laws of
probability. The certainty effect, coupled with diminishing sensitivity, enhances the
aversiveness of a sure loss and reduces the aversiveness of the gamble.
This is the ugly corner of human decisionmaking where otherwise responsible
parties find themselves tempted to take risks that can “turn[] manageable failures
into disasters.”41 “Rogue traders” who have amassed appalling losses let it all ride on
a single act of reckless arbitrage. That gamble may destroy a systemically important
financial institution.42 “Because defeat is so difficult to accept,” chief executive
officers and field marshals suffer from a comparable inability to cut their losses and
salvage what is left of their companies and armies.43
37

(1952).

See, e.g., Arthur D. Roy, Safety First and the Holding of Assets, 20 ECONOMETRICA 431, 440

38 See Tina Rosenberg, Playing the Odds on Savings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2014), at SR3,
available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/playing-the-odds-on-saving/; cf. Charles
T. Clotfelter et al., State Lotteries at the Turn of the Century: Report to the National Gambling
Impact Study Commission 13 (Apr. 23, 1999), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
ngisc/reports/lotfinal.pdf (reporting that “lottery expenditures represent a much larger burden on
the household budget for those with low incomes than for those with high incomes”).
39 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 318.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 319.
42 See e.g., Stephen Gandel, How JPMorgan Made Its Multi-billion Dollar Blunder, CNN
MONEY (May 15, 2012), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/15/jpmorgan-london-whale-blunder/
(discussing Bruno Iksil, better known as the “London Whale,” who inflicted a multibillion dollar loss
on J.P. Morgan Chase in 2012); Roger Parloff, How MF Global’s ‘Missing’ $1.5 Billion was Lost—and
Found, CNN MONEY (Nov. 15, 2013), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/11/15/mf-global-joncorzine/; Roger Lowenstein, Long-Term Capital Management: It’s a Short-term Memory, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/worldbusiness/07iht-07ltcm.15941880.
html?pagewanted=all; The Economy: How Leeson Broke the Bank, BBC NEWS BUSINESS (June 22,
1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/375259.stm (detailing how Nick Leeson’s ill-fated trade
destroyed Barings Bank in 1995).
43 KAHNEMAN, supra note 19, at 319.
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Bioprospect theory helps explain why international economic and environmental
law reaches such perverse outcomes in its approach to biodiversity conservation and
bioprospecting. Biodiversity policy stinks because it disobeys the standard riskaverse pattern of human conduct and follows instead the contrary axis of riskseeking behavior. The fate of the biosphere presents either (1) a low probability of
immense gain (through bioprospecting) or (2) a high probability of immense loss
(through global climate change). The lottery effect readily explains the overvaluing
of commercial bioprospecting. Pharmaceutical companies and protesters accusing
them of biopiracy have this much in common:
both sides are bedazzled—
irrationally—by the possibility that some lucrative cure for cancer may lurk in a
Brazilian rain forest.44
The looming loss of global biological diversity, on a geologically significant scale,
poses an even more disturbing prospect. The magnitude of ecological losses is
increasing at an alarming rate, even more so once we move past the relatively
narrow frame of biodiversity and contemplate the possibility of complete disruption
of global climatic systems. As the costs and the likely futility of mitigating action
increase,45 humans find their own heuristics shoving their collective decisionmaking
processes further onto the frontier of desperation, where risk-averse acts such as
insurance lose their appeal and yield ground to active risk-seeking. System 1—the
rapid, automatic decisionmaking system that has propelled humanity from
Pleistocene competitiveness to Holocene dominance46—may be pushing Homo sapiens
to the edge of extinction by its own talented hand. The global collapse of biodiversity
is the ultimate ecosystem service provided by indicator species: ask not “for whom
the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”47 Bioprospect theory provides the blueprint by which
humanity might eschew the remote prospect of wealth, if only momentarily, and
focus on how it might better manage anthropogenic ecological disasters before they
become full-blown, irreversible cataclysms of global proportions.

44 See Chen, supra note 13, at 25; Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 519, 521, 532, 533, 536 (2003).
45 See generally Climate Change 2013:
The Physical Science Basis, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2014), available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/
uploads/WGIAR5_WGI—12Doc2b_FinalDraft_All.pdf.
46 See generally Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning:
Implications for the Rationality Debate, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 645, 659, 715 (2000).
47 JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 198 (Anthony Raspa ed., Oxford
Univ. Press U.S.A. 1987) (1624) (emphasis in original).
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III. THE PATIENT IN THE TOWER48
Let us turn now from the abortive rescue of the global biospheric commons to the
contested reform of the American health care system. The Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in the 2012 case of National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius,49 which upheld the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 as
an exercise of the federal government’s taxing authority, completes our examination
of prospect theory in legal action.
Although Sebelius upheld the PPACA, a key portion of that decision illuminates
a striking vein of risk-seeking reasoning and rhetoric.50 A majority of Justices
participating in Sebelius reasoned that a directive aimed at uninsured individuals to
buy health insurance lay beyond the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.51 Chief Justice Roberts and a joint dissent comprising Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, despite their differences, agreed to reject congressional
regulation of interstate commerce as a basis for inflicting a financial loss, in the form
of a premium paid on unwanted health insurance, through the coercive force of the
Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate.52 If Congress may not compel young,
48 The title for this part is inspired by Jungfrun i tornet (The Maiden in the Tower), the only
opera by the legendary Finnish composer, Jean Sibelius.
49 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608–09 (2012).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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healthy individuals to buy insurance, precisely because those people believe that they
are better off shouldering catastrophic illness or injury, Congress might lack power to
compel wage-earners to accept annuity-like income streams through Social
Security.53
In dramatic controversies addressing questions of life or death, the Supreme
Court is fond of disclaiming such awesome power by declaring instead that it is
deciding just another “case about federalism.”54 Sebelius was no exception. In the
prologue to his opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts endorsed the Court’s
longstanding maxim that “federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from
the diffusion of sovereign power.”55 True to Justice Sandra O’Connor’s declaration
that “the tension between federal and state power” holds “the promise of liberty,”56
Sebelius observed: “[b]y denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all
the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from
arbitrary power.”57
Of the 10 titles, 900 pages, and hundreds of sections in the PPACA, Sebelius
focused on “two key provisions, commonly referred to as the individual mandate and
the Medicaid expansion.”58 The individual mandate requires most Americans to
maintain a “minimum essential” level of health insurance.59 Those who fail to
comply with the individual mandate must make a “[s]hared responsibility payment”
to the federal government in the form of a “‘penalty’ . . . calculated as a percentage of
household income, subject to a floor based on a specified dollar amount and a ceiling
based on the average annual premium . . . for qualifying private health insurance.”60
The PPACA’s Medicaid expansion builds upon the baseline established in 1965
by the original Medicaid program.61 By 1982, every state had chosen to accept
“federal funding . . . to assist pregnant women, children, needy families, the blind,
the elderly, and the disabled in obtaining medical care,” all according to “federal
criteria governing matters such as who receives care and what services are provided
at what cost.”62 The expansion commits states to cover all individuals, including
childless adults, who are younger than sixty-five and whose income falls below 133
percent of the federal poverty line.63 Federal support would cover the full cost of the
Medicaid expansion through 2016 and would gradually decrease to a minimum of
ninety percent.64

53 See id. at 2612. Contra Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644–45 (1937).
54 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991).
55 N.Y. v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992); accord Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
56 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991); accord United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
576 (1995).
57 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011); accord Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
58 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2580.
59 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012).
60 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2580 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1), (c) (2012)).
61 Id. at 2581.
62 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2012)).
63 See id. at 2601 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 1396a(k)(1), 1396u–7(b)(5),
18022(b) (2012)).
64 See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (2012)).
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Chief Justice Roberts rejected the individual mandate as a proper exercise of
Congress’s power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”65 “The
individual mandate,” he wrote, “does not regulate existing commercial activity. It
instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a
product . . . .”66 He feared that “[c]onstruing the Commerce Clause to permit
Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open
a new and potentially vast domain to” federal legislative power.67 At an extreme,
such an interpretation of the commerce clause could let Congress “address the diet
problem” in American public health policy “by ordering everyone to buy vegetables.”68
Although Chief Justice Roberts took pains to distinguish the regulation of
homegrown wheat in Wickard v. Filburn,69 despite that decision’s notoriety as
“perhaps the most far reaching” application of the commerce clause to “intrastate
activity,”70 the horror of compulsory broccoli purchases had helped to sink the
constitutionality of the individual mandate—at least as an application of the
commerce clause.71
On this point, Chief Justice Roberts won the support of four dissenting Justices
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito), who characterized the use of the commerce
power to impose the individual mandate as a bid “to extend federal power to virtually
everything,” with “no principled limits.”72 In even more vivid language, the dissent
contended that allowing Congress to “reach out and command even those furthest
removed from an interstate market to participate in the market” would transmogrify
“the Commerce Clause [into] a font of unlimited power . . . ‘the hideous monster
whose devouring jaws . . . spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor
profane.’”73
Chief Justice Roberts nevertheless upheld the individual mandate and its
enforcement through a “shared responsibility payment” as an exercise of Congress’s
power “to lay and collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the common

65 See id. at 2621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
66 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (emphasis in original).
67 Id. (emphasis in original).
68 Id. at 2588; see also id. at 2591 (rejecting the government’s argument that “upholding the
individual mandate would not justify mandatory purchases of items such as cars or broccoli”).
69 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942).
70 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995); accord Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2588.
Although Filburn, like Sebelius, involved the voluntary avoidance of a market transaction inasmuch
as “the farmer’s decision to grow wheat for his own use allowed him to avoid purchasing wheat in
the market,” Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that farmer Filburn “was at least actively engaged in
the production of wheat, and the Government could regulate that activity because of its effect on
commerce.” Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2588; see also id. at 2643 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing
Filburn “as the ne plus ultra of expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence”); id. at 2648 (describing
Filburn “as the most expansive assertion of the commerce power in our history”). See generally Jim
Chen, Filburn’s Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719 (2003).
71 See Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and
Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Decision, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66, 109, 119 (2013).
72 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2648 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 2646 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
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Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”74 Despite the payment’s
considerable impact on revenue—“the payment is expected to raise about $4 billion
per year by 2017”75—Chief Justice Roberts conceded that the shared responsibility
payment “is plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage.”76
In practical terms, Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to uphold the individual
mandate as “a valid exercise of the taxing power,”77 coupled with the willingness of
four other Justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, Sotomayor) to uphold that provision on
either commerce clause or taxing power grounds, preserved this pivotal portion of the
PPACA. But the Chief Justice and the Sebelius dissenters have left an indelible
imprint on the analysis of law as an exercise in behavioral psychology. Those
Justices’ shared characterization of the individual mandate as the economic
conscription of unwilling individuals into the health insurance market looms as a
rejection of the risk-averse axis in prospect theory. So strong is the interest of the
healthy individual who prefers to opt out of organized health insurance markets that
a majority of today’s Supreme Court—a fractured, defeated majority, to be sure, but
five Justices nonetheless—is willing to shelter such a refusal from the otherwise
plenary power of the federal government to regulate nationwide commerce.78
In turning to the Medicaid expansion provisions of the PPACA, Chief Justice
Roberts again struck the mystic chords of federalism, touched by the bitter angels of
liberty. Neither the spending power79 nor any other provision of the Constitution
“confer[s] upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to
Congress’ instructions,”80 lest “the two-government system . . . give way to a system
that vests power in one central government” at the expense of “individual liberty.”81
To the Chief Justice, the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion hinged on
the gradual, almost learned dependency of the states on federal funding. “Federal
funds received through the Medicaid program have become a substantial part of state
budgets, now constituting over [ten] percent of most States’ total revenue.”82 This
fact distinguished the PPACA and Sebelius from the drinking age requirement on
which the federal government had conditioned five percent of highway funding in
South Dakota v. Dole.83 In that case, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned, the federal
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594.
76 Id. at 2596.
77 Id.
78 Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (“At the beginning, Chief Justice Marshall
described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded.”) (citing Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194–95 (1824)).
79 S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). The power “[T]o lay and collect Taxes . . . to pay the
Debts and provide for the Common Defense and general Welfare of the United States” under U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, implies a power to spend and a further “[i]ncident[al]” power to “attach
conditions on the receipt of federal funds.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 206. See generally Jeffrey T. Renz,
What Spending Clause? (or The President’s Paramour): An Examination of the Views of Hamilton,
Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause I of the United States Constitution, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 85 (1999).
80 N.Y. v. United States, 525 U.S. 144, 162 (1992); accord Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
81 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
82 Id. at 2581.
83 483 U.S. 203, 209 (1987).
74
75
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highway funds that were contingent on the state’s raising of its drinking age to
twenty-one represented “less than half of one percent of South Dakota’s budget at the
time.”84 By contrast, Medicaid spending comprises more than a fifth of the average
state’s total budget, and federal funds cover between one half and five-sixths of those
costs.85
Under these conditions, wrote Chief Justice Roberts, “the financial ‘inducement’
Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun
to the head.”86 Unlike the palpable but ultimately resistible prod of federal highway
funding in Dole, “[t]he threatened loss of over [ten] percent of a State’s overall budget
is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in
the Medicaid expansion.”87
Economic coercion of the states through federal spending is a familiar refrain in
American constitutional law. The dispute over the constitutionality of Medicaid
expansion in Sebelius reprises a debate that was perhaps most famously conducted
by the Supreme Court across its 1935 and 1936 terms: United States v. Butler88 and
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.89 Steward upheld provisions of the Social Security
Act that encouraged states to establish their own social safety nets by offering partial
refunds of federal Social Security taxes.90 Whereas those provisions had not passed
“the point at which pressure turns into compulsion,”91 Butler struck down the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (not to be confused with the 1938 statute of the
same name, ultimately upheld in Wickard v. Filburn). The contrast between Butler
and Steward, two cases decided merely sixteen months apart, could not have been
starker.
In a contemporary constitutional culture that describes a future reduction in
federal Medicaid funding as “a gun to the head,” Butler’s depiction of coercion is
worth quoting at length:
The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to coerce or
destroy. If the cotton grower elects not to accept the benefits, he will receive
less for his crops; those who receive payments will be able to undersell him.
The result may well be financial ruin . . . . [T]he Department of Agriculture
has properly described the plan as one to keep a nonco-operating minority
in line. This is coercion by economic pressure. The asserted power of choice
is illusory.92

Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 211).
See id. (reporting that “approximately $3.3 trillion between 2010 and 2019” would be needed
“[T]o cover the costs of pre-expansion Medicaid”) (emphasis in original).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 2605; see also id. at 2605 n.12 (decrying the possibility that “the Federal Government
[could] increase requirements” under the Medicaid program “in such a manner as to impose
unfunded mandates on the States”).
88 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936).
89 Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 590; accord S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
92 Butler, 297 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
84
85
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This vision of coercion finds its strongest contemporary validation in Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion in Sebelius. Three-quarters of a century after the Supreme Court
debated the meaning of coercion in Butler and Steward, a majority of Justices has
reversed the tide of history and sided with Butler.93 Characterizing the power to
confer or to withhold benefits as the ultimate power to destroy puts a fine twist on
one of the oldest truths in American constitutional law, the recognition that it is
truly “the power to tax [that] involves the power to destroy.”94 That this rhetorical
inversion of taxing versus spending should be given effect through a decision
upholding an individual mandate to buy health insurance as an exercise of
Congress’s power of the purse is an irony “too extravagant to be maintained.”95

IV. PINWHEEL OF FORTUNE
The Supreme Court’s rhetorical flourishes aside, the real irony of the debate
over national health care reform in Sebelius is that public policy encouraging
individuals to insure against calamity is the essence of a temperamentally (if not
politically) conservative approach to personal finance. A near cousin of that risk93 Cf. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 216 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(criticizing Butler as an “ill-starred opinion . . . in which the Court held unconstitutional what would
have been an otherwise valid tax on the processing of agricultural products because of the use to
which the revenue raised by the tax was put”).
94 McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
95 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803).
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avoiding principle is a commitment to accepting lower but steadier streams of income
as a hedge against the possibility of complete loss, an admittedly unlikely event that
would have catastrophic consequences if it should ever come to pass. In questioning
the constitutionality of the individual mandate and in invalidating outright the
Medicaid expansion provisions of the Affordable Care Act, Chief Justice Roberts’
principal opinion in Sebelius has raised serious barriers to legislative initiatives that
would encourage the population at large to take economic action whose prudence
arises from most individuals’ aversion to risk.
Despite its contribution to political theater in an ideologically riven United
States, Sebelius involved at most a modest expansion of constitutional principles
governing congressional power to curb risk-seeking behavior among individuals. As
Justice Ginsburg noted in her opinion, health care is unique among markets in two
respects. First, its consumption is universal and inevitable, albeit “unpredictable.”96
Second, the provision of health care, at least on an emergency basis, is guaranteed.97
In other markets, consumers “get no free ride or food,” much less “at the expense of
another consumer forced to pay at an inflated price.”98 Seen in this light, the decision
to forgo health insurance is better understood as a decision to self-insure—or,
perhaps more accurately, to self-redistribute—against health care expenses incurred
over the course of each individual’s lifetime.99 “A person who self-insures opts
against prepayment for a product the person will in time consume.”100
At the governmental level, the case for rationalizing health care and health
insurance markets on a national basis is even more compelling. States that might
otherwise decide on their own to expand health care coverage face a very real firstmover disadvantage. They are likely to attract the sick, the old, and the poor.
Absent federal coordination, health care expansion within a single state will serve as
“bait to the needy and dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and seek a
haven of repose.”101 Just as healthy individuals face a powerful incentive to opt out
of health insurance markets whose participants are comparatively infirm, individual
states are “separately incompetent” to tackle the extraordinary challenges of health
care reform.102 Given the nearly intractable problems of adverse selection in all
markets for health care and health insurance,103 the Affordable Care Act is best
96 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2619 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
97 Id. at 2620.
98 Id.
99 See id.; cf. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (observing that old age
“marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span”).
100 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2622 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting-in-part).
101 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937); accord Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2612 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
102 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2628 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting-in-part).
103 See Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. F.T.C., 807 F.2d 1381, 1391 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[N]onprofit hospitals,
private and public, harbor considerable antipathy toward proprietary hospitals, regarding them as
‘cream skimmers’ who lure away the affluent patients that nonproprietary hospitals need to defray
the costs of serving the less affluent.”); David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection
in Health Insurance, 1 FORUM FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 1, 1 (1998); Denis Drechsler & Johannes
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understood—and deserves to be upheld, as a matter of constitutional law, if not as
necessarily a matter of sound economic policy104—as the federal government’s best
effort to “avoid[] an insurance-market death spiral.”105
When paired with international environmental law’s treatment of biodiversity
conservation and bioprospecting, Sebelius covers the entirety of prospect theory’s
“fourfold pattern.”
Whereas “Bioprospect Theory” mapped international
environmental law along prospect theory’s risk-seeking axis, the exegesis of Sebelius
in “The Patient in the Tower” articulates a commerce clause jurisprudence that reeks
of substantive due process.106 Lochner’s rough beast, its hour come round at last,
slouches toward Washington to be reborn.107 Sebelius recognizes a tacit liberty
interest against being coerced to insure. Limiting congressional power to regulate
commerce would prevent compulsory acceptance of annuity-like income streams.
This limit completes a second, countervailing legal axis, one that actively enables
healthy, optimistic individuals to refuse risk-averse hedges against improbable losses
or against the comparably improbable failure to attain future wealth.
Sanity knows no refuge in a jurisprudence of risk.108 The law of intellectual
property and health care, as illustrated through international law on biodiversity
conservation and through constitutional controversies involving universal health
care coverage, privileges private risk-seeking behavior over risk-averse public policy.
In both domains, prospect theory evidently condemns lawmakers and the public alike

Jütting, Different Countries, Different Needs: The Role of Private Health Insurance in Developing
Countries, 32 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 497, 507 (2007) (describing the “common
phenomenon” of “[c]ream skimming” in health care, “in which private providers primarily target
good-risk individuals”); David A. Hyman, When and Why Lawyers Are the Problem, 57 DEPAUL L.
REV. 267, 272 (2008) (“The effect of this specialized care delivery model on traditional primary care
practices may be to remove some patients and services from the doctor's office, leaving a sicker
population behind.”). See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 493–94 (1970); Jim Chen,
Creamskimming and Competition, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 7, 15 (2014) (describing adverse selection
and creamskimming in a wide variety of markets, including health care and health insurance
markets).
104 Cf. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 96–97 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (recognizing that “a law can be both economic folly and
constitutional” and expressing willingness to uphold a law that “is at least the latter”).
105 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2628 n.11 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
106 See id. at 2629 (contending that the Chief Justice’s commerce clause opinion “and even more
so the joint dissenters’ reasoning, . . . bear a disquieting resemblance to . . . long-overruled
decisions” in cases such as Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905)); cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2653, 2675, 2685 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (warning that heightened constitutional review
of “ordinary economic regulations” might “reawaken[] Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting
judicial for democratic decisionmaking”). See generally Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The
New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998).
107 Cf. William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS: A
NEW EDITION 187 (Richard J. Finneran ed., 1983) (“And what rough beast, its hour come round at
last, Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?”).
108 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (“Liberty finds no
refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”).
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“to wager [their] salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.”109
So spins the law’s Pinwheel of Fortune.

109

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

